Aldo Brancacci

Resumen: El concepto de pónos ("esfuerzo") es el fundamento de la ética de Antístenes, en la que se conecta estrechamente con el de phrónesis ("inte-ligencia", "sabiduría"): ambos conceptos definen la acción moral. En particular, en el pónos se expresan el ejercicio constante, la capacidad de persistir en una tarea y, en un nivel aun superior, la energía espiritual, que se requieren para la realización de la virtud en las obras y que conducen a la conquista de la felicidad. Ello es coherente con el hecho de que la sophía antisténica se manifiesta en un complejo de funciones que, conforme al significado teórico propio del intelectualismo ético socrático, presuponen, por un lado, la unidad de teoría y praxis y, por otro, la convergencia de conocimiento y voluntad.

With the use of a particular metaphor, which appears at the end of the Cratylus and is taken up with perfect symmetry at the beginning of the Theaetetus, Plato certainly wanted to indicate the succession of Cratylus-Theaetetus as an order for reading the two dialogues, which Trasillus faithfully reproduced in structuring the second tetralogy of Platonic dialogues. The claim of the theory of ideas, with which the Cratylus ends, must therefore be considered the background in which to place not only the analysis of the name carried out in the Cratylus, but also the discussion and criticism of the epistemological theories examined and refuted in the Theaetetus. The transition from the discussion of the name to that of the logos is another important theoretical element that connects the two dialogues. Another one is the theory of knowledge, already precisely elaborated in the Cra-tylus, and taken up and deepened in the Theaetetus. Finally, the theme of false and error is a third theoretical element common to the two dialogues, which, starting from Euthydemus, finds its solution in the Sophist.

Cet article se propose de mettre en lumière la centralité du thème de la vie, et du rapport entre vie et pensée, dans la philosophie de Socrate. Ce thème est étroitement lié chez Socrate à la justification du sens de sa propre philosophie, qui repose non pas sur un certain « mode de vie », mais sur une série de principes théoriques forts et clairement définis. Or ces principes ne peuvent se réaliser que lorsqu'ils trouvent leur matière d'actualisation et leur instrument de contrôle dans la réa-lité de la vie. Cela implique l'élaboration d'un nouveau concept de « vie », ainsi que du concept fondamental de « vivre en philoso-phant » : ce dernier indique une sorte de déplacement continu du plan de la pensée au plan de la vie, et vice versa, du particulier à l'universel, et vice versa, car seul, chacun des deux est insuffisant. ABSTRACT This article aims to highlight the importance of the theme of life, and of the relationship between life and thought, in Socrates' philosophy. For Socrates, this theme is closely linked to an explanation of the sense of his own philosophy, which is not based on a certain « way of life », but on a series of strong and clearly-defined theoretical principles. These principles can, however, only be achieved once their terms of actualization and instrument of control have been found within the reality of life. All the considerations above lead Socrates towards the edi-fication of a new concept of « life » and the prescription « to live phi-losophizing ». The latter notion suggests a constant shifting from the ground of thought to that of life, and vice versa, and from the ground of the particular to that of the universal, and vice versa, since each of them, considered by itself, proves to be insufficient.

La filosofia di Diogene è un eudemonismo, che non esclude, ma anzi implica, il riconoscimento di un moderato edonismo, sorvegliato dalla ragione e consono con gli ideali di autosufficienza propri del saggio cinico. La felicità consiste in uno stato di beatitudine a un tempo intellettuale ed emotivo cui si accompagna uno stato edonico, che non ha nulla a che vedere con il «piacere» (ἡδονή) comunemente inteso, ma designa il vivere sereno, piacevole e dolce che caratterizza l'atteggiamento di Diogene nei confronti della realtà e della φύσις. Né v'è contrapposizione tra momento ascetico e mo-mento edonico, ma anzi stretta connessione e compenetrazione: essi restituiscano due motivi co-originari del cinismo di Diogene. Quanto all'ἄσκησις, essa va intesa come un concetto dinamico, designante una attività realmente capace di operare una trasforma-zione dell'uomo atta a condurlo alla felicità.

This paper argues that the strong relationship between moral truth and knowledge is the main feature of Socrates' philosophy and what makes him the real discoverer of ethics. In particular, this point explains the peculiar knowledge model adopted by Socrates, who, while admitting to be aware of his ignorance, shows instead his deep knowledge in a series of philosophical domains. Moreover, all this process makes the Socratic concept of anthropine sophia something dynamic and essential for philosophical inquiry. At the beginning, the paper also provides a new look at the so-called Socratic question. Publié en 1913, Sokrates. Sein Werk und seine geschichtliche Stellung1 est encore de nos jours le plus riche et, peut-être même, le plus beau livre qui ait été écrit sur Socrate, bien qu'il puisse se révéler dépassé sur un certain nombre de questions, notamment en ce qui concerne l'interprétation des Socratiques que la recherche a par la suite éclairée d'un jour nouveau. Dans son livre, Heinrich Maier baptisait comme personalia Socratica de Platon deux de ses oeuvres : l'Apologie de Socrate et le Criton. Dans le même contexte, il avisait le lecteur que cette expression devait être interprétée dans le sens que les deux écrits en question ne représentaient pas une pure et simple exposition des conceptions de Socrate, mais qu'ils transmettaient plutôt la vision et l'expérience la plus 1 Maier (1913).

Although Euthydemus has never been included in the great general collections of testimonies and fragments related to the Sophistic movement, he is certainly to be considered a historical personage who really existed (and not a literary one, or a «mask» as for Antisthenes). This article tries to reconstruct his use of language, his ontology, and his concept of paideia. The latter has a strong competitive trait; his ontology implies the denial of a stable substance and of specific qualities, and can be considered a radicalization of Protagoras’ relativism; his use of language is essentially founded on two principles, the denial of distinction (or separation) between word and thing, and between word and thought, and in this Euthydemus is probably affected by the influence of Gorgias.

According to Epicurus, natural and necessary desires –the only ones that Epicurus admits– are those that look to happiness (eudaimonia), physical well-being (aokhlesia), and life itself. The desire for philosophy is the natural and necessary desire which looks to happiness. Philosophy, insofar as it frees us from ambitions, from the desire for power, for wealth, for fame, changes human beings and it creates a ‘new man’, so to speak. This great transformation makes it possibile to establish this entirely different kind of relationship with other men, which is friendship. Being that friends live thanks to the logoi –the philosophical reasoning–, friendship requires sharing life together. Thus, a friend is a living representative of philosophical truth; at the same time, he is its witness and hence its guarantor.

Euthydemus is included neither in Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker by Diels–Kranz nor in Sofisti. Testimonianze e frammenti by Untersteiner nor in Early Greek Philosophy by Laks and Most. Likewise, the great twentieth century works on the Sophists do not give space to him, at best mentioning him briefly. Yet Euthydemus is the author of a fragment, which was quoted by Plato in his Cratylus, and on which again there is no modern study. This paper sets out to study this fragment in depth, to review and discuss the various translations, both existing and possible, to study the context of Plato's quotation, to clarify the exact meaning and the theoretical scope of this important fragment, and lastly to place Euthydemus in the Protagorean tradition, of which he is a notable product.

RÉSUMÉ La polémique contre les oracles développée par OEnomaos de Gadara n'a jamais été reconstituée. Nous nous proposons de la reconstruire et de montrer que cette polémique et celle contre le fatalisme développée par le même OEnomaos sont intriquées et se soutiennent réciproque-ment. Notre analyse se divise en deux parties : dans la première, nous reconstituons les principes exégétiques de la critique des oracles, tels qu'ils apparaissent dans les chapitres 19-36 du livre V de la Praepara-tio evangelica d'Eusèbe ; dans la seconde, nous reconstituons les arguments qu'élabore OEnomaos dans le long chapitre 7 du livre VI du même ouvrage pour reduire à néant la prétention des oracles à être, avant même que véridiques, significatifs, apophantiques, doués de sens. ABSTRACT The polemic against the oracles by Oenomaus of Gadara has never been retraced. My main objective with this paper is to do so, and to show that this polemic and the anti-fatalistic polemic, broader and elaborate , also produced by Oenomaus, are tightly connected and mutually support each other. My analysis falls into two parts : in the first part, I reconstruct and highlight the exegetical principles which Oenomaus endorses and supports in his criticism of the oracles contained in chapters 19-36 of book V of the Praeparatio evangelica by Eusebius ; in the second, I reconstruct the arguments which Oenomaus puts forward in the lengthy chapter 7 (book VI of the same work) in order to refute the pretense to the oracles of being, even before true, apophantic and having a sense.

The origins of the reflection on music in ancient Greece lie not in philosophy but in the poetic tradition. Starting from the reconstruction of the fundamental functions of music and the different aesthetic values assigned to singing in Homer's poems, this article reconstructs the development of aesthetic ideas, themes and concepts in the poets' reflection on their own art and composing method and style, in a philosophical journey that goes from Hesiod to Lasus of Hermione and Pratinas. The subsequent reflection on music by philosophers does not come out of the blue, but, as several specific examples show, factually presupposes these complex, rich, and, so to speak, preliminary stages. RÉSUMÉ Les origines de la réflexion sur la musique dans la Grèce ancienne sont à chercher non dans la philosophie, mais dans la tradition poétique. Partant de la reconstruction des fonctions fondamentales de la musique et des différentes valeurs esthétiques assignées au chant dans les poèmes homériques, cet article reconstruit le développement des idées, thèmes et concepts esthétiques dans la réflexion des poètes sur leur propre art, leur méthode et leur style de composition, au fil d'un itiné-raire philosophique qui va d'Hésiode à Lasos d'Hermione et à Prati-nas. La réflexion ultérieure des philosophes sur la musique ne naît pas de nulle part, mais, comme le montrent plusieurs exemples spéci-fiques, présuppose ces étapes complexes, riches et pour ainsi dire pré-liminaires.

This article reconstructs the work of John Moles, eminent classicist with a wide range of interests, as a historian of ancient philosophy. The article focuses on Moles' studies of Dio Chrysostom, Cynicism, and Aristotle's Poetics. In particular, the article presents Moles' ever original interpretations, based on an exceptional knowledge of the ancient sources and modern scholarship. The article highlights the fundamental characteristics of Moles' approach to the history of ancient philosophy, which is grounded in a firm historical basis and in detailed, acute, and always rigorously demonstrative analyses of texts. Moles' contribution to the history of ancient philosophy is marked by strong ethical motivations and a commitment to trace in classical texts not just mere data, but rather values and ideas to be preserved and reflected upon.

Ancient Cynicism is entirely based on the relationship between subject, context, and environment: it outlines the discovery of a kind of «instrumental» and «strategic» rationality founded on the concept of Selbstbehauptung, that
is the instance supporting, on the one hand, the treatment of the self, and, on the other hand, Cynic’s behavior in regard to the world. Through conveniently directed work on himself (askesis), the Cynical philosopher strengthens himself,
makes himself reactive, becomes the architect of his own place in reality and in different societies: he is able to resist and prove victorious. The treatment of others is expressed in a series of attitudes, now aggressive, now defensive (including particularly autárkeia), which validate the Cynical criticism of human foolishness, conventional values, and fixed social behaviors.

Keywords: Diogenes of Sinope, Socrates, Aristotle, Cynical Rationality, Treatment of the Self and the Others.